30 Years After - the Legacy of
America's Largest Nuclear Test

Date posted: 17 Jun 2000

From:  In These Times  August 1999  http://www.inthesetimes.com/stclair2317.html

By Jeffrey St. Clair
Credit: Jim Rinnert

Amchitka Island sits at the midway point on the great arc of Alaska's Aleutian Islands, less than 900 miles across the  Bering Sea from the coast of Russia. Amchitka, a spongy  landscape of maritime tundra, is one of the most southerly of the Aleutians. The island's relatively temperate climate has made it one of the Arctic's most valuable bird sanctuaries, a critical staging ground for more than 100  migratory species, as well as home to walruses, sea otters  and sea lions. Off the coast of Amchitka is a thriving fishery of salmon, pollock, haddock and halibut.

All of these values were recognized early on. In 1913,  Amchitka was designated as a national wildlife refuge by  President William Howard Taft. But these ecological  wonders were swept aside in the early '60s when the  Pentagon and the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) went  on the lookout for a new place to blow up H-bombs. Thirty  years ago, Amchitka was the site of three large  underground nuclear tests, including the most powerful  nuclear explosion ever detonated by the United States.

The aftershocks of those blasts are still being felt. Despite  claims by the AEC and the Pentagon that the test sites  would safely contain the radiation released by the blasts for  thousands of years, independent research by Greenpeace  and newly released documents from the Department of  Energy (DOE) show that the Amchitka tests began to leak  almost immediately. Highly radioactive elements and gasses,  such as tritium, americium-241 and plutonium, poured out  of the collapsed test shafts, leached into the groundwater  and worked their way into ponds, creeks and the Bering  Sea. At the same time, thousands of Amchitka laborers and  Aleuts living on nearby islands were put in harm's way.  Dozens have died of radiation-linked cancers. The response  of the federal government to these disturbing findings has  been almost as troublesome as the circumstances  surrounding the tests themselves: a consistent pattern of  indifference, denial and cover-up continues even today.

 There were several factors behind the selection of  Amchitka as a test site. One most certainly was the  proximity to the Soviet Union. These explosions were  meant to send a message. Indeed, the tests were designed  to calibrate the performance of the Spartan anti-ballistic  missile, built to take out the Soviet nuclear arsenal. Publicly,  however, the rationale offered by the AEC and the Defense  Department was simply that Amchitka was a remote, and  therefore safe, testing ground. "The site was selected­and I  underscore the point­because of the virtually zero likelihood  of any damage," claimed James Schlesinger, then chairman  of the AEC.

What Schlesinger and his cohorts overlooked was the  remarkable culture of the Aleuts. Amchitka may have been  remote from the continental United States, but for nearly  10,000 years it had been the home of the Aleuts. Indeed,  anthropologists believe the islands around Amchitka may be  the oldest continuously inhabited area in North America.  The aleuts left Amchitka in the 1880s after Russian fur  traders had wiped out the sea otter population, but they  continued to inhabit nearby islands and relied on the waters  near Amchitka for subsistence. The Aleuts raised forceful  objections to the tests, pointing to the risk of radiation  leaks, earthquakes and tsunamis that might overwhelm their  coastal villages. These concerns were never addressed by  the federal government. In fact, the Aleuts were never  consulted about the possible dangers at all.

In 1965, the Long Shot test exploded an 80 kiloton  bomb. The $10 million test, the first one supervised by the  Pentagon and not the AEC, was really a trial run for bigger  things to come. But small as it was, there were immediate  problems. Despite claims by the Pentagon that the test site  would not leak, radioactive tritium and krypton-85 began to  seep into freshwater lakes almost instantly. But evidence of  radioactivity, collected by Defense Department scientists  only three months after the test, was kept secret for five  years. The bomb site continues to spill toxins into the  environment. In 1993, EPA researchers detected high levels  of tritium in groundwater samples taken near the test site.

The contamination from Long Shot didn't deter the  Pentagon bomb-testers. In 1969, the AEC drilled a hole  4,000 feet deep into the rock of Amchitka and set off the  Milrow nuclear test. The one megaton blast was 10 times as  powerful as Long Shot. The AEC called it a "calibration  test" designed to see if Amchitka could withstand a much  larger test. The evidence should have convinced them of  their dangerous folly. The blast triggered a string of small  earthquakes and several massive landslides; knocked water  from ponds, rivers and lakes more than 50 feet into the air;  and, according to government accounts, "turned the  surrounding sea to froth."

A year later, the AEC and the Pentagon announced their  plans for the Cannikin nuclear test. At five megatons,  Cannikin was to be the biggest underground nuclear  explosion ever conducted by the United States. The blast  would be 385 times as powerful as the bomb dropped on  Hiroshima. Cannikin became a rallying point for native  groups, anti-war and anti-nuke activists, and the nascent  environmental movement. Indeed, it was opposition to  Cannikin by Canadian and American greens, who tried to  disrupt the test by taking boats near the island, that sparked  the birth of Greenpeace.

A lawsuit was filed in federal court, charging that the test  violated the Limited Test Ban Treaty and the newly enacted  National Environmental Policy Act. In a 4 to 3 decision, the  Supreme Court refused to halt the test. What the Court  didn't know, however, was that six federal agencies,  including the departments of State and Interior, and the  fledgling EPA, had lodged serious objections to the  Cannikin test, ranging from environmental and health  concerns to legal and diplomatic problems. Nixon issued an  executive order to keep the comments from being released.  These documents, known as the Cannikin Papers, came to  symbolize the continuing pattern of secrecy and cover-up  that typified the nation's nuclear testing program. Even so,  five hours after the ruling was handed down on Nov. 6,  1971, the AEC and the Pentagon pulled the switch,  detonating the Cannikin bomb.

In an effort to calm growing public opposition, AEC chief  Schlesinger dismissed environmental protesters and the  Aleuts as doomsayers, taking his family with him to watch  the test. "It's fun for the kids and my wife is delighted to get  away from the house for awhile," he quipped.

With the Schlesingers looking on, the Cannikin bomb, a  300-foot-long device implanted in a mile-deep hole under  Cannikin lake, exploded with the force of an earthquake  registering 7.0 on the Richter Scale. The shock of the blast  scooped a mile-wide, 60-foot-deep subsidence crater in  the ground over the test site and triggered massive rockfalls.

The immediate ecological damage from the blast was  staggering. Nearly 1,000 sea otters, a species once hunted  to near extinction, were killed­their skulls crushed by the  shockwaves of the explosion. Other marine mammals died  when their eyes were blown out of their sockets or when  their lungs ruptured. Thousands of birds also perished, their  spines snapped and their legs pushed through their bodies.  (Neither the Pentagon nor the Fish and Wildlife Service has  ever studied the long-term ecological consequences of the  Amchitka explosions.) Most worrisome was that a large  volume of water from White Alice Creek vanished after the  blast. The disappearance of the creek was more than a sign  of Cannikin's horrific power. It was also an indication that  the project had gone terribly wrong; the blast ruptured the  crust of the earth, sucking the creek into a brand new  aquifer, a radioactive one.

In the months following the explosion, blood and urine  samples were taken from Aleuts living in the village of Adak  on a nearby island. The samples were shown to have  abnormally high levels of tritium and cesium-137, both  known carcinogens. Despite these alarming findings, the  feds never went back to Adak to conduct follow-up  medical studies. The Aleuts, who continue their seafaring  lifestyle, are particularly vulnerable to  radiation-contaminated fish and marine mammals, and  radiation that might spread through the Bering Sea, plants  and iceflows.

But the Aleuts weren't the only ones exposed to Cannikin's  radioactive wrath. More than 1,500 workers who helped  build the test sites, operate the bomb tests and clean up  afterward were also put at risk. The AEC never conducted  medical studies on any of these laborers. When the Alaska  District Council of Laborers of the AFL-CIO, began  looking into the matter in the early '90s, the DOE claimed  that none of the workers had been exposed to radiation.  They later were forced to admit that exposure records and  dosimeter badges had been lost.

In June 1996, two Greenpeace researchers, Pam Miller  and Norm Buske, returned to Amchitka. Buske, a physicist,  collected water and plant samples from various sites on the  island. Despite claims by the DOE that the radiation would  be contained, the samples taken by Buske revealed the  presence of plutonium and americium-241 in freshwater  plants at the edge of the Bering Sea. In other words,  Cannikin continues to leak. Both of these radioactive  elements are extremely toxic and have half-lives of hundreds  of years.

In part because of the report issued by Miller and Buske,  a new sense of urgency was lent to the claims of laborers  who said they had become sick after working at the  Amchitka nuclear site. In 1998, the union commissioned a  study by Rosalie Bertell, a former consultant to the Nuclear  Regulatory Commission (which replaced the AEC). Bertell  found that hundreds of Amchitka workers were exposed to  ionizing radiation at five times the level then recognized as  hazardous. However, the research is complicated by the  fact that many of the records from the Amchitka blast  remain classified and others were simply tossed away. "The  loss of worker exposure records, or the failure to keep such  records, was inexcusable," Bertell says.

One of the driving forces behind the effort to seek justice for the Amchitka workers and the Aleuts is Beverley Aleck.  Her husband Nick helped drill the mile-deep pit for the Cannikin test; four years later, he died of myelogenous  leukemia, a type of cancer associated with radiation exposure. Aleck, an Aleut, has waged a multi-year battle  with the DOE to open the records and to begin a health  monitoring program for the Amchitka workers. In April of  this year, the Clinton administration finally agreed to begin  the first health survey of the Amchitka workers. The study  was supposed to begin this summer, but it is languishing  without funding.

Will the victims of the Amchitka blasts ever get justice?  Don't count on it. For starters, the Aleuts and Amchitka  workers are specifically excluded by the Radiation  Exposure Compensation Act from receiving medical  assistance, death benefits or financial compensation. There is move to amend this legal loophole, but even that wouldn't  mean the workers and Aleuts would be treated fairly. The  DOE has tried repeatedly to stiff arm other cases by either dismissing the link between radiation exposure and cancer or, when that fails, invoking a "sovereignty" doctrine, which  claims the agency is immune from civil lawsuits.

Dr. Paul Seligman, deputy assistant secretary of the DOE's Office of Health Studies, writes it off as the price of  the Cold War. "These were hazardous operations,"  Seligman says. "The hazards were well understood, but the  priorities at the time were weapons production and the  defense of the nation."

At a time when the mainstream press and Republican  politicians are howling over lax security at nuclear weapons  sites and Chinese espionage, a more dangerous betrayal of  trust is the withholding of test data from the American  public. China may use the Los Alamos secrets to upgrade  its tiny nuclear arsenal, but the Amchitka explosions already  have imperiled a thriving marine ecosystem and caused  dozens  of lethal cancers.

The continuing cover-up and manipulation of information  by the DOE not only denies justice to the victims of  Amchitka, but indicates that those living near other DOE  sites may be at great risk. "DOE management of the U.S.  nuclear weapons complex is of the old school in which bad  news is hidden," says Pamela Miller, now executive director  of Alaska Community Action on Toxics. "This conflicts with  sound risk management and makes the entire system  inherently risky. The overwhelming threat is of an  unanticipated catastrophe."   Jeffrey St. Clair is a contributing editor of In These  Times.


One minor note on the above article:
The half-life of plutonium 239 is, unfortunately formammals, 24.000 years.  For plutonium 240, it is even longer.  Let's just say that thousands of centuries from now, it will still be around to cause cancer.  I would also be worried about Cesium 137 and Strontium 90, too. Cesium 137 concentrates in the muscle tissues of fish and other animals as it works its way up the food chain (half-life 30 years). Strontium 90 gets into your bones (half-life 28 years).  It takes about 20 half-lives for the isotopes to effectively disappear. One-millionth of a gram of Pu-239 will give you lung cancer (If inhaled); one-thousandth of a gram in your lungs will cause pulmonary fibrosis and kill you in a few hours.  Pu 239 can find its way into the food chains through the soil and water.  It is 486 million times more poisonous than arsenic.  Plutonium is named after the God of the Underworld.  It didn't exist on Earth until the mid-19th century.  In our infinite wisdom, we have manufactured many hundreds of tons of the stuff in nuclear reactors (and continue to do so).  I am concerned about the effects of the plutonium which was vaporized and released as global fallout during the atmospheric testing in the 1950's and 1960's.  At least one-half of the plutonium from the weapons did not undergo fission, but became radioactive dust.  This means that hundreds of thousands of pounds of the stuff was let loose.  How big a role is this playing in the current epidemic rates of cancer?

Steven Starr
 


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